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Abstract
We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for
Nash implementation, using three subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as three outcomes, states
of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism successfully implements the desired
outcome a large majority of the time, providing empirical evidence for the feasibility of such
implementation. In addition, the performance is further improved by imposing a fine on a dissident,
so that the mechanism implements strict Nash equilibria. While our environment is stylized, our
results offer hope that experiments can identify reasonable features for practical implementation
mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
The theory of implementation addresses the problem of designing mechanisms whose
equilibria satisfy certain socially desirable properties, but that do not require the author-
ities to have unrealistically accurate information about the underlying parameters of the
economy. Mechanism design is important in many social choice problems, such as the se-
lection of candidates for an election, the design of a constitution, or the optimal allocation
of resources in economies with public goods. Several theoretical mechanisms have been
∗ Corresponding author
E-mail address: charness@econ ucsb edu (G Charness)
1
discussed in the literature and some have been studied experimentally.1 Yet these mech-
anisms either work only for a limited set of environments or do not seem to fare well
empirically.
In this paper, we perform an experimental test of a modification of the canonical mecha-
nism for implementation in Nash equilibria (see Maskin, 1999; Repullo, 1987) and provide
some encouraging empirical evidence regarding the feasibility of this mechanism. This
mechanism is important because it allows the implementation in Nash equilibria in any
possible environment of any Nash implementable social objective.
We require the agents to announce the state of the world (the hidden information in which
the planner is interested), an outcome (for example, an allocation of private and public
goods and perhaps side payments) and an integer. If everyone announces the same state, or
if there is only one departure from a consensus announcement, the integer is not relevant
in determining the outcome. If there is more than one such departure from unanimity, the
person who announces the highest number gets her announced outcome.
It is easy to prove that such a game cannot have an equilibrium where, with positive
probability, there is more than one deviation; the artful part of the design is to permit
and require the right kind of consensus to be the equilibrium. Our experiment models
an environment where there are three states of the world (preference profiles) and three
outcomes. The preferences of the three agents cycle around these three outcomes in the
three states, but the social choice rule picks a specific one in each state of the world.
We concentrate on such a rule for several reasons. First, we show that it is not imple-
mentable in dominant strategies, so that it is natural to look for a mechanism that implements
in Nash equilibria. Second, there is no focal choice in each state, and some agent does suf-
ficiently poorly (in comparative terms) in the allocation prescribed by the social choice rule
that, unless there is an enforcing mechanism, telling the truth is not an obvious choice. At
the same time, the environment is simple enough to be understood by the subjects. While our
environment is quite stylized, we make successful implementation as difficult as possible
by assigning conflicting preferences to each of three types. Since the problem is therefore
non-trivial, successful performance would offer hope that this mechanism could be effective
in more general environments.
We conducted four sessions, two in each of two treatments. The first treatment (the base-
line) uses the mechanism as described. In the second treatment, we introduce a fine if and
only if there is a dissident, so that the mechanism implements strict Nash equilibria.2 The
likelihood of the desired outcome being implemented was 0.68 in the baseline treatment
and 0.80 in the second treatment. Both proportions represent a substantial degree of imple-
mentation, particularly with respect to the obvious comparison to an uninformed planner.
Since the introduction of fines enhances the observed effectiveness, this suggests that there
is room for improvement to the modified canonical mechanism.
1 Chen and Tang (1998) conduct a comparative study of the basic quadratic mechanism of Groves and Ledyard
(1977) and the paired-difference mechanism by Walker (1981). Elbittar and Kagel (1997) compare the performance
of Moore’s (1992) and Perry and Reny’s (1999) mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of an indivisible
private good among two players (King Solomon’s Dilemma). Sefton and Yavas (1996) study the mechanism
proposed by Abreu and Matsushima (1992). Katok et al. (2001) compare the Abreu and Matsushima mechanism
with the Glazer and Perry (1996) mechanism, finding that the predicted outcome is rarely observed in either case.
2 This term is defined in Section 2.1.
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Yet implementation of the desired outcome often occurs as a consequence of people
playing strategy profiles that are not Nash equilibria in pure strategies.3 We offer an ad hoc,
but plausible, explanation of this fact based on two elements: (1) a taste for truth-telling—
agents prefer to tell the truth (ceteris paribus), so are willing to accept some (possibly small)
monetary losses in return for doing so; and (2) risk aversion. If the preferences with respect
to telling the truth can be described by an extra “monetary equivalent” amount inserted in
the utility function, then the subject preferences can be totally described by two parameters,
the monetary equivalent to the truth and the coefficient of relative risk aversion.4
While we do not claim to have fully resolved this puzzle, and are aware that our environ-
ment is not general, we feel that the clear patterns we observe and the relative success of
this mechanism offer hope for identifying reasonable features for practical implementation
mechanisms.
2. The social choice problem
The canonical mechanism for implementation in Nash equilibria can implement a wide
variety of social choice rules, under a large domain of preferences. Yet this mechanism
is quite controversial. According to Jackson (1992, p. 757) “A nagging criticism of the
theory is that the mechanisms used in the general constructive proofs have ‘unnatural’
features.” Moore also asserts that the mechanisms for Nash implementation are “highly
complex—often employing some unconvincing device such as an integer game.” If this
argument holds, one might expect rather limited success for Nash implementation. Under
these circumstances, an experimental test may offer some insight.
This version of the mechanism requires a truly infinite strategy space (i.e. allowing all
integers). We modify the mechanism because this requirement seems incompatible with
an experiment having a finite duration. Our design uses a common modification of the
mechanism in which players can choose from a finite number (3 in our case) of integers. If
these integers are needed to determine the outcome, they are added together; on the basis of
this sum (modulo 3), one player’s announced outcome is selected. With this modification,
the mechanism implements the social choice rule in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; that is,
the only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome for each state corresponds to the outcome
of the social choice rule.5
We describe our mechanism formally in Section 2.1and offer a motivation in Section 2.2.
2.1. The environment and the mechanism
Let us first describe the environment in which the mechanism is to be used. There are
three individuals indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, three possible outcomes (a, b, c), as well as
3 This was the case for 55 of the 68 successful implementations in the baseline treatment and for 60 of the 80
successful implementations by the mechanism with fines.
4 We suppose that subjects have utility functions with constant relative risk aversion, so that their preferences
with respect to risk can be described by a single parameter.
5 However, there are mixed strategy equilibria that have different outcomes with positive probability.
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three states of the world (red, yellow, green). The preferences of the individuals among the
outcomes in the three states of the world can be described as follows.
With these preferences, any deterministic single-valued social choice function must, in
every state, assign the worst outcome in the preference ordering to one of the players.
This will be seen to have important implications for the properties of the mechanisms that
implement such social choice functions.
We now introduce the social choice function that we wish to implement with our exper-
imental design:
F(red ) = a, F (yellow) = c, F (green) = b
Proposition 1. The social choice function F(·) cannot be implemented in dominant
strategies.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This result makes apparent the necessity of implementing with a different equilibrium
concept. The obvious choice in this case is to implement in Nash equilibrium. We will use
a version of the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation (Maskin, 1999; Repullo,
1987; McKelvey, 1989). Let us now describe the mechanism.
2.1.1. Strategy space
Let Θ = {red, yellow, green} be the set of states. Let Λ = {a, b, c}, and N = {1, 2, 3}.
The individual strategies belong to Θ ×Λ×N .
2.1.2. Outcome function
1. If the three individuals announce:
red, the outcome is F(red) = a,
yellow, the outcome is F(yellow) = c,
green, the outcome is F(green) = b.
2. If exactly two agents announce red and:
1 announces yellow, the outcome is b,
1 announces green, the outcome is c,
otherwise the outcome is a.
3. If exactly two agents announce yellow and:
2 announces red, the outcome is b,
2 announces green, the outcome is a,
otherwise the outcome is c.
4. If exactly two agents announce green and:
3 announces red, the outcome is c,
3 announces yellow, the outcome is a,
otherwise the outcome is b.
5. If the three agents announce different states, then the integers announced by the three
players are added.
If the sum is 4 or 7, then the outcome is the one chosen by player 1.
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If the sum is 5 or 8, then the outcome is the one chosen by player 2.
If the sum is 3, 6 or 9, then the outcome is the one chosen by player 3.
Proposition 2. This mechanism implements F(·) in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Note that there are also mixed-strategy equilibria which produce outcomes different
from the ones in F(·). These equilibria may be useful for understanding the experimental
results. The standard canonical mechanism implements in pure and mixed strategy Nash
equilibria.6The difference with the mechanism used here is that in the classical version the
players can announce any integer, and the outcome is the one announced by the person who
announces the highest integer (ties can be broken arbitrarily). As mentioned earlier, this
modification is dictated by practical concerns.
Another important issue is that the pure-strategy equilibria of the mechanism are such that
some players are using a weak best response. The reason is that the outcome these agents
receive in equilibrium is the least-preferred one for them. Thus, there would be no harm in
changing the strategy used, if the other players continue using the equilibrium strategies.
This, however, does not imply that the equilibrium strategy (which involves announcing the
true state) is weakly dominated for the player who gets the least-preferred outcome under
F(·). It can be checked (from the Table that summarizes payoffs in the instructions) that
there are some combinations of strategies for the other players such that announcing the
true-state results in the most preferred outcome. Even taking this into account, it will be
clear from the experimental results that the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium is quite
important.
However, there are some weakly dominated strategies. If an agent does not announce
her most preferred outcome under the true state of the world, she is using a strategy that
is weakly dominated (by another that announces the same state and integer and the most
preferred outcome). This will serve us as an indirect check of whether the agents understood
the workings of the mechanism.
To check the importance of the fact that equilibrium strategies are weak best responses for
some agents, we created a version of the mechanism that modifies rules 2–4 and punishes a
solo deviation by any agent for whom deviating is a weak best response. Any such deviating
agent we call a dissident. In this way, the mechanism implements in strict Nash equilibria
(recall that strict equilibria must be in pure strategies). Cabrales (1999) shows that when
implementation is in strict Nash equilibria, boundedly rational agents are able to reach
the equilibrium and will stay there. This need not happen when agents have multiple best
responses at equilibrium. This argument suggests that the performance of the modified
game may lead to better results. The complete rules for the new mechanism can be found
in Appendix C; here we describe the revised rule.
2. If exactly two agents announce red and:
1 announces yellow, the outcome is b,
6 As described by Repullo, for example.
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1 announces green, the outcome is c,
otherwise the outcome is a and the dissident pays a fine of x pesetas.7
As we will see in the data section, this change does make a difference in the behavior
of the players and the proportion of times that the outcome F(·) is attained. The following
corollary is straightforward from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. The modified mechanism implements F(·) in strict Nash equilibrium.
2.2. Motivation
We motivate the social choice problem and the mechanism used to solve it with problems
from constitutional design and from optimal allocation of resources. This presentation
highlights the fact that the mechanism we use can potentially be applied to a wide array of
problems.
2.2.1. Constitutional design
A country called Freedonia was founded 200 years ago. The founding fathers designed
a constitution establishing the rules of the game and the civil rights to which the citizens
of Freedonia are entitled. The rules that are of immediate interest to us are as follows. The
constitution distinguishes three possible states.
• Foreign threat (denoted by red in the formal description later), which occurs when it is
likely that an enemy country attacks Freedonia.
• Home threat (denoted by green in the formal description later), which occurs when there
are riots that cannot be controlled by normal police force.
• Normality (denoted by yellow in the formal description later), which occurs when the
rest of the constitution applies.
Three actions can be taken likewise.
• General mobilization (denoted by a).
• Suspension of certain civil rights (denoted by b).
• No particular action (denoted by c).
The founders could not predict when each of these contingencies would occur, nor the
preferences for the person in each role in each state. But they devised the rules (the mecha-
nism) through which the legitimate powers of Freedonia could decree which of the actions
should be taken. These rules are described as follows.
1. There are three people who can give an opinion about the state in which Freedonia finds
itself: the President of Freedonia (representing the executive power), the Speaker of
the Parliament (representing the legislative power) and the most senior member of the
Supreme Court (representing the judiciary).
7 The fine in our design was either 100 or 200 pesetas (depending on the circumstances), or between 10 and
20% of expected payoffs in a round. See Appendix C for details.
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Table 1
Preferences
State
Red Yellow Green
Player 1 a 	 b 	 c b 	 c 	 a c 	 a 	 b
Player 2 b 	 c 	 a c 	 a 	 b a 	 b 	 c
Player 3 c 	 a 	 b a 	 b 	 c b 	 c 	 a
2. At the beginning of each parliamentary session, each of these individuals sends a message
to the High Notary of the Republic. The messages, sent simultaneously and without
consultation, declare the state in which the Republic finds itself (red, yellow, green), the
action to be taken (a, b, c), and an integer (1, 2, 3).
3. The rules that determine the action finally taken are described in Section 2.1 under the
label “Outcome function”, where agent 1 is the President, agent 2 is the Speaker and
agent 3 the Supreme Court member.
The aim of this procedure was to achieve, for each state, the actions specified by the social
choice function in Section 2.1. The founders thought this would work, having anticipated
that preferences for these three agents (described in Section 2.1 under “Preferences”) would
be such that the only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game in each state yields the
desired outcome (see Proposition 2).
2.2.2. Optimal resource allocation
Suppose that a government has two possible sectors in which to spend money: police and
environment. There are two possible levels of expenditure (H and L); budget constraints
make it impossible to spend H in both sectors. Thus, there are only three alternatives: (a)
spend H on police and L on environment, (b) spend L on police and H on environment, and
(c) spend L on both police and environment. There are three players (groups of voters), each
representing a different “region”.
The “states” describe the three possible profiles of preference orderings of the economic
alternatives identified in Table 1. In addition, the preferences of player 1 are the more
“intense” ones in state red, the preferences of player 2 are the more intense ones in state
yellow, and the preferences of player 3 are the more intense ones in state green. A player
with intense preferences is more likely to organize a violent revolt if her first preference
is not implemented, and the planner’s objective is to keep the social peace. So the planner
prefers (a) in state red, (c) in state yellow, and (b) in state green.
3. Experimental design
Sessions were conducted at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. There were 15
participants in each session. The average net pay was about US$ 10 per subject and sessions
lasted <2 h.8
8 The pay might seem low by the US standards; however, students have very low opportunity costs. This is
demonstrated by the ease of recruiting for experiments at Pompeu Fabra.
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Achieving comprehension and salience in this experiment was non-trivial. At the be-
ginning of a session, the instructions and a decision sheet were passed out to each sub-
ject. The decision sheet stated the subject number and type. Instructions covered all rules
used to determine the outcome for each group and the resulting payoffs to each player
in the group; these were read aloud to the entire room. As the experimental set-up is not
a familiar environment, the instructions also contained an example where the states of
Nature were types of weather, the outcomes were activities, and the three types had differ-
ent state-dependent preferences among these activities.9 The complete instructions can be
found in Appendix C.
To aid comprehension, we included complete payoff tables and seven exercise questions,
which were discussed aloud. When the instructional phase was concluded, we proceeded
with the session. As there were five subjects of each type, we had five groups of three
in each of the 10 rounds of the experiment.10 These groups were varied—an anonymous
matching process was devised so that no two groups ever had the same composition.11 This
non-repeat feature was public knowledge.
At the start of a round, a monitor made a blind draw (with replacement) of a colored
card from a box held by the experimenter. This box contained three yellow, four green,
and five red cards.12 The color drawn was the state of Nature and was known to all. On
their decision sheets, participants then announced a color, an integer from {1, 2, 3}, and a
preferred outcome. As described in Section 2.2, if all three members of a group announced
different colors, the sum of the integers chosen determined which member’s preferred
outcome was implemented. Since each type was aware of the true state of Nature, each type
has a unique preference among the possible outcomes. Thus, we have one rationality test
embedded in the experiment—if a subject did not choose her preferred outcome, it would
appear that the instructions were not well understood.
The decision sheets were collected, announcements collated, and outcomes and payoffs
determined. An individual’s payoff for the period was written on her decision sheet (see
Appendix C) and the sheets were returned to the subjects. The next round was then initiated
by another draw from the box of colored cards. Subjects were made aware that the experi-
ment would continue until 10 rounds were completed. At the end of the session, participants
were paid based on the payoffs achieved in a randomly-selected round.13
As mentioned earlier, two types of sessions were conducted. The baseline session featured
payoffs of 500, 1000, or 1500 pesetas, with 500 pesetas added as a show-up fee. In the
second treatment, where we explore whether the disincentive of a fine would enhance the
mechanism’s success rate, a fine of 100 or 200 pesetas (depending on the combination of
type and the state of Nature; see the instructions) was deducted from a dissident’s payoff.
9 We thank James Costain for this idea.
10 As we conducted our sessions by hand (perhaps thereby increasing the credibility of the random draw), it was
not feasible to have more than 10 periods in a session.
11 With 15 players in groups of three and 10 periods, it is not mathematically possible to arrange matters so that
no two players are ever in the same group twice.
12 This deliberate asymmetry was an attempt to create a bit of friction, perhaps making successful implementation
somewhat more difficult.
13 This was done in an attempt to make payoffs more “salient” to the subjects, as this method makes the nominal
payoffs 10 times as large as would be the case if payoffs were aggregated over 10 periods.
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Fig. 1. Rate of successful implementation over time.
This modification cannot guarantee that it is the dissident who is being dishonest, but it
does make false reporting riskier.
At the end of the session, each participant was paid individually and privately. We did
not employ the two-stage lottery payoff procedure (e.g. Roth and Malouf, 1979), as many
observers (e.g. Selten et al., 1999) feel that this is not very effective in experiments, and we
also felt that there was already sufficient complexity in our experimental design.14
4. Results
Detailed data for all sessions are shown in Appendix D. The success of the mechanism in
implementing F(·) is considerable. We find that the social choice function was successfully
implemented in 68 of 100 instances in the baseline treatment—35 of 50 in session 1, and 33
of 50 in session 2. This rate increased to 80% in the treatment with a fine for a dissident—39
of 50 in session 3 and 41 of 50 in session 4. Fig. 1 shows the rate of successful implementation
by periods for each treatment; there is no clear trend across time.
We can make a statistical comparison between the observed success rate in the baseline
treatment and the success rate if a planner simply implements policy based on the most
likely state (here red, with P = 5/12). On this basis, the rate of successful implementation
would have been no more than 60% in any of the four sessions.15 While the test of the equal-
ity of proportions rejects the hypothesis of identical success rates at a significance level of
14 It is also worth noting that, according to the theory no correction for risk preferences should be needed since
the equilibrium would be in pure strategies and the outcome would not be random.
15 The number of (red, green, yellow) draws in sessions 1–4 were (3, 4, 3), (6, 2, 2), (3, 3, 4), and (3, 3, 4). Even
if the planner were told ex ante which state would be the most common and implemented for this state, success
rates would always be lower than ours.
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Table 2
Aggregated truthful reporting
Treatment Most-favored state Second-favored state Least-favored state Total
Baseline 93/100 (93%) 55/100 (55%) 23/100 (23%) 171/300 (57%)
Fine 90/100 (90%) 66/100 (66%) 44/100 (44%) 200/300 (67%)
P < 0.001, this test treats each individual observation as being independent.16 We can
perform a more conservative test by ranking the rates of successful implementation in
our sessions to the rate of successful implementation for an uninformed planner, assum-
ing the most likely state (either ex ante or ex post) has occurred. The nonparametric
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank-sum test (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988) ranks these eight
rates (four sessions× two implementation methods) and shows that we obtain significantly
more (P = 0.014) successful implementation.
We also find that the fine increases the success rate significantly from that observed in the
baseline mechanism (and obviously also in comparison to the rate in the simulated sessions).
By ranking the rates of successful implementation for each true state in each session, we
obtain 6 observations in each treatment (two sessions× three states), or 12 observations in
all. Once again, the Wilcoxon test indicates a significant difference (P = 0.013) in the rates
of successful implementation.17 This rank-sum test can also be used to compare individual
truth-telling rates for the 30 subjects in each treatment, yielding a significant difference
(P = 0.004) for a comparison across the two treatments.18
We find that the proportion of subjects who announce the true state follows a consistent
pattern. The likelihood that a subject makes a true announcement is directly related to the
payoff the subject would receive if all group members reported the state truthfully. This
pattern is reassuring and provides further evidence that the subjects understood the payoffs
in the game. Table 2 shows the likelihood of a true announcement in each state for each
treatment.19
The overall rate of truth-telling is 57% in the baseline treatment, and 67% in the second
treatment. Notice that the biggest behavioral change, where the associated rate of truthful
16 The (see Glasnapp and Poggio (1985)) specific test statistic is Z = (RB − RF )/SPC , where Ri is the rate
of successful implementation in treatment i, and the estimate of the S.E. of (RB − RF ) is: SPC = (RB −
RF )/
√
(RC)(1− RC)((1/NB) + (1/NF )), where RC = (RBNB + RFNF )/(NB + NF ) is the estimate of the
population proportion under the null hypothesis of equal proportions, and Ni is the number of observations in
treatment i.
17 While the outcomes in each state are not truly independent (since the same subjects make choices in different
true states), their circumstances are different. Cooper and Kagel (2000) present evidence suggesting that there is
generally little transfer across games and roles in experiments.
18 As we do not have convergence in our limited number of periods, there is some concern that this difference across
treatments may be sensitive to results in individual periods. However, even if we exclude from our analysis that
period (10) with the greatest difference across treatments, the results of the Wilcoxon test on successful outcomes
across treatments (by state of nature) remain significant at P = 0.047. The test results on individual truth-telling
across treatments are still significant at P = 0.011; overall, excluding this 10th period reduces the difference in
the rates of successful implementation across treatments only from 80% versus 68% to 80% versus 71%.
19 The agents have been re-labeled, so that the types here correspond to the ranking of the outcome of the social
choice function in a state.
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Fig. 2. Individual frequency of truth-telling—baseline treatment.
announcements nearly doubles, is observed for the type who would receive the lowest payoff
if all types told the truth. The patterns are largely confirmed on the individual level: the rate
of truth-telling in these three cases is similarly (weakly) monotonically decreasing for 40
of the 60 participants. Appendix C presents detail on truthful reporting by individual and
state. Figs. 2 and 3 show how the individual truth-telling rates depend on the favorability
of the state in our treatments.
In both treatments, around four-fifths of the subjects reported the true state whenever it
was the most favorable one, with similar patterns across treatments for the remaining minor-
ity. For the second state, truth-telling in the baseline treatment is first-order stochastically
Fig. 3. Individual frequency of truth-telling—fine treatment.
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Fig. 4. Comprehension scores: time (%) choosing correct outcome.
dominated by truth-telling in the fine treatment. However, it is visually clear that the biggest
difference on an individual level is seen in behavior when the least favorable state is drawn.
The dramatic difference in truth-telling rates across roles is evidence that people did not
simply report the true state because it was focal, but rather were (at least to a substantial
degree) able to understand the instructions and make reasoned choices.
We also note that the observed sample variance for the number of successful implemen-
tations in each treatment is much lower with a fine: 0.67 (fine) versus 2.40 (baseline); there
appears to be less uncertainty in this environment. This inference is also supported by the
observation that the integer game was needed to determine the outcome 18% of the time in
the baseline case, but with a likelihood of only 7% when a fine was possible. This difference
in rates is significant at P < 0.02, by the equality of proportions test.
Finally, the implicit comprehension test provided by the announced preferred outcomes
indicates a reasonable level of general understanding, as 34 of the 60 subjects selected the
appropriate outcome in all 10 rounds and, on average, 84% of all announced outcomes were
individually optimal. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of “comprehension scores”.
5. Discussion
Two patterns are clear from the data. The first is that the mechanism achieves substantial
success in terms of obtaining the outcome that F(·) selects, despite the conflicting prefer-
ences of the three agents in a group. The second is that the observed behavior conforms
more with the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when the fines are introduced.
In any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile, all players tell the truth. We do not observe
this, as the observed frequency of the Nash equilibrium profile is around 0.13 in the baseline
treatment and around 0.20 in the treatment with fines. To obtain the outcome desired by
the social choice function, it is sufficient that the first player and either the second or
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Table 3
Frequency of announced outcomes
State
Red Yellow Green
Player 1 93 5 2
Player 2 23 27 50
Player 3 54 40 6
Table 4
Payoffs for reduced game
Player 3 choice
Red Yellow Green
Player 2 choice
Red u(5), u(10) u(5), u(10) u(5), u(10)
Yellow u(5), u(10) u(10), u(15) Eu(I), Eu(I)
Green u(5), u(10) Eu(I), Eu(I) u(15), u(5)
third announce the truth. This explains a major portion of the success of the mechanism in
implementing F(·).20
To explain the players’ behavior leading to these results, we concentrate on the game
without fines.21 To make the analysis simpler, we will focus on the case where the true
state is red; the game is the same (subject to re-labeling) for yellow or green. We now
summarize the information of the observed behavior from Table 2, aggregating the re-
sults after re-labeling the games for the three states so that they represent the same game
(Table 3).
When the true state is red, the player 1 agent gets her favorite outcome under F(·), player
3 gets her middle outcome, and player 2 gets her worst outcome. It turns out that, given the
actual strategies of the other players, announcing red is indeed a best response for player 1,
for most specifications of the risk preferences. For this reason, we neglect the uncertainty
in the behavior of player 1, simply assuming she always tells the truth.
The behavior of the players 2 and 3 is a little more difficult to explain. Consider the game
that results for players 2 and 3 once the strategy of player 1 is fixed as red. To simplify
even further, assume that the three integers are used about one-third of the time and that
players always announce their most favorite outcome in the true state of the world (these
assumptions are in line with observed behavior). Let Eu(I ) = (u(5) + u(10) + u(15))/3.
The game between players 2 and 3 is then as follows (Table 4).
20 Note that given the observed frequencies, the probability that the most favored player plus at least one of the
others announce the truth is 0.93× (0.54+ 0.23− 0.54× 0.23) ∼= 0.60 in the baseline, compared to 0.68 correct
implementation. In the fine treatment, we have 0.90 × (0.66 + 0.45 − 0.66 × 0.45) ∼= 0.73, compared to the
correct implementation rate of 0.80.
21 The explanations given here also work well for the game with fines, as shown in Appendix B.
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Strategy green is weakly dominated for player 3, and given that strategies yellow and
green are used a significant proportion of the time by player 2, it is not (absent other
considerations) a best response for 3 to use green. This readily explains the low observed
frequency of this strategy for player 3. We now propose some plausible explanations for
the remaining behavior.
One surprising observation, given Table 4, is that player 2 uses strategy red a significant
proportion of the time despite its being weakly dominated (independently of risk prefer-
ences). Learning or bounded rationality cannot explain this fact. Even under a learning
hypothesis, a strategy that is used in the limit must be at least almost as good (in the limit) as
the alternatives. First, notice that player 3 rarely chooses green. So strategy red for player 2
would be as profitable as yellow or green in the limit, if the proportion of the time that player
3 uses yellow becomes very small over time. But an examination of the data in Appendix D
shows that this is not the case (for example, when the true state was red in one of the last three
periods of the baseline treatment, 6 out of 15 times player 3 reported yellow). If the players
are confused and not reasoning very well, they should make other types of “mistakes” more
often, like playing yellow or green when they are player 1, or playing green when they are
player 3.
A plausible alternative explanation is that using strategy red gives some of the subjects
that play as player 2 some utility above the purely monetary return. Playing red is “the
truth”, so they may get utility from doing so. Since all types get their preferred outcome in
some states of the world, perhaps people feel that the outcome is fair if all individuals tell
the truth.
One must also explain the significant number of yellow and green choices by player 2,
and red and yellow by player 3. If the players were all risk neutral, yellow would be weakly
dominated for 2 and red would be weakly dominated for 3. As before, learning or bounded
rationality is not the most plausible explanation in this case. Some taste for truth-telling
might explain why some individuals choose red in the player 3 role. But this cannot explain
the choice of yellow by player 2. Since green is riskier than yellow, a degree of risk aversion
for some players could explain the observed choices.
In Appendix B, we perform a small calibration exercise, which shows that neither the
taste for truth-telling nor the degree of risk aversion need be very large to justify the actual
choices made in the experiment. While these explanations for the observed behavior are
ad hoc, other stories do not seem suitable; thus we feel that our interpretation is plausible.
Furthermore, the behavior in the game with fines can also be explained (even numerically,
as shown in Appendix B) with the same arguments. In fact, the calibration appears to be
robust in the sense that the calibrated values for the two models (with and without fines)
are the same.
To summarize, the observed behavior can be explained with players that are very mildly
risk averse and have some preference for truth-telling. The first part of the explanation
is mainstream economics and seems quite plausible (even for the low stakes involved in
the experiment), as the degree of risk aversion necessary is really quite small. While the
second part may be more controversial, we have not found a better explanation. Ascertaining
whether subjects do actually have this preference would require an entirely different design
and more theoretical efforts devoted to understanding the phenomenon. Our experiment
suggests that this might be a fruitful line of research.
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6. Conclusion
We find that our canonical mechanism for Nash implementation can be quite successful
in implementing the social choice function, with an observed success rate of 68% in the
baseline treatment. With the inclusion of a fine for being a dissident, the mechanism’s
performance increases to 80%. Agents’ behavior may be explained by taking into account
some taste for truth-telling and possible risk preferences. Criticisms that such a mechanism
would prove too complex seem to be unfounded here, as embedded comprehension tests
offer evidence that most participants understood the structure of the environment. A note
of caution is advisable on this point, however, our environment has only three states; it is
conceivable that the perceived complexity would increase dramatically when the number of
states increases. But as we argue later, the increasing complexity may actually help, rather
than harm, the rate of implementation.
From a theoretical standpoint, the results indicate that if social goals imply some people
will be treated badly (i.e. they get their least-preferred allocation), these people will depart
from Nash equilibrium strategies. Therefore, failure to achieve the social goal is not due to
unnatural features of the mechanism, but perhaps is instead induced by social goals being
perceived as unfair.
An important question suggested by the experimental results is whether the success
rate in implementation can be sustained in a different environment, with more agents,
states and outcomes, and different utilities. This is especially pressing because the success
was obtained in spite of low Nash equilibrium frequencies. While the success rate we
observe may not be general, the tendencies we have seen in the data allow us to make some
conjectures about when the mechanism would be effective.
A major reason why the mechanism succeeds is that only two agents must play the
Nash strategies to obtain the Nash outcome. In general games, n − 1 agents need play
the Nash strategy to obtain the Nash outcome. While this would seem to make successful
implementation more difficult in general, note that to obtain anything different from the
integer game in the Nash mechanism, a coincidence of n−1 players is required anyway. If,
due to risk aversion, agents try to avoid the integer game (and the social choice function does
not treat them too unfavorably), announcing the truth seems like a clear alternative. This
could induce a reasonable success rate, which would be increased by a taste for truth-telling
in the population.
More empirical research is needed to settle the question. We hope that our study
encourages further experiments designed to develop practical implementation
mechanisms.
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Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. To implement F(·) in dominant strategies (by contradiction), there
must be a strategy set S, an outcome function g : S → {a, b, c}, and strategies sji , such
that sji is dominant for agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} in state j ∈ {r, y, g}, where r stands for red, y for
yellow, and g for green.
Since g(·) implements F(·), we must have that g(sr1, sr2, sr3) = a. Since a is the least
favorite outcome for player 2 under state r, and sr2 is dominant for 2 under r, we must have
that g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
r
3) = a. Similarly, since c is the least favorite outcome for player 3 under
state y, and sy3 is dominant for 3 under y, we must have that g(s
y
1 , s
y
2 , s
g
3) = c. Also, since
b is the least favorite outcome for player 1 under state g, and sg1 is dominant for 1 under g,
we must have that g(sr1, s
g
2 , s
g
3) = b.
Let  mean “is weakly preferred to”. Now since sr1 is dominant for 1 under r and sy1 is
dominant under y, we must have that g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
g
3)  g(sy1 , sy2 , sg3) for player 1 under state
r and g(sy1 , s
y
2 , s
g
3)  g(sr1, sy2 , sg3) for player 1 under state y. Since we just showed that
g(s
y
1 , s
y
2 , s
g
3) = c, this implies that g(sr1, sy2 , sg3) = b.
Since sy2 is dominant for player 2 under y and s
g
2 is dominant under g, we must have
that g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
g
3)  g(sr1, sg2 , sg3) for player 2 under state y and g(sr1, sg2 , sg3)  g(sr1, sy2 , sg3)
for player 2 under state g. Since we just showed that g(sr1, sg2 , sg3) = b, this implies that
g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
g
3) = a.
Since sr3 is dominant for 3 under r and s
g
3 is dominant under g, we must have that
g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
g
3)  g(sr1, sy2 , sr3) for player 3 under state g and g(sr1, sy2 , sr3)  g(sr1, sy2 , sg3) for
player 3 under state r. Since we just showed that g(sr1, sy2 , sr3) = a, this implies that
g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
g
3) = c.
Since g(sr1, s
y
2 , s
g
3) = b, g(sr1, sy2 , sg3) = a, and g(sr1, sy2 , sg3) = c, and there are no other
outcomes, we reach a contradiction and the result follows.
This result is useful to know because it makes apparent the necessity of implementing
with a different equilibrium concept. The obvious choice in this case is to implement F(·)
in Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, notice that a strategy profile in which all agents announce
the true state is a Nash equilibrium, as the only agent who can change the outcome in that
case is the one who already has her favorite outcome.
Now we show that outcomes that are not desired by the social choice function cannot be
the outcome of a pure-strategy equilibrium. For this, we consider several subcases.
1. Suppose that all agents are announcing untruthfully the same state. In this case, there is
an agent (agent 1 if the consensus is r, agent 2 if it is y, and 3 if it is g) that can change
the outcome and strictly improve by announcing the true state.
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2. Suppose that exactly two agents are announcing the same state. One of those agents is
not getting her favorite outcome. That agent can change her announcement of the state in
such a way that three different states will be announced. She can also choose the integer
so that the outcome, she announces is selected. If she chooses her favorite outcome she
will obtain a strict improvement.
3. Suppose that the outcome is determined by looking at the integers. Then, either of the
agents who is not obtaining her favorite outcome can change her announcement of the
integer so that the outcome she announces is the one selected. If she also announces her
favorite outcome she obtains a strict improvement.
Since this exhausts all cases, the results follow. 
Appendix B. Calibration of risk aversion and “taste for truth-telling”
parameters
Let us first consider player 2. She uses strategy yellow and strategy green a significant
proportion of the time. Suppose she believed that the probabilities for player 3 to use
strategies (red, yellow, green) are respectively (0.54, 0.40, 0.06) as we observe in the data.
Assume also that her preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion, so that u(c) = cα/α
(for α ≤ 1, α = 0).22 Under this assumption, the value of α that is necessary to make a
player 2 indifferent between yellow and green is 0.20. The usual estimated values for this
parameter are between −1 and −4, which represent even higher aversion to risk; however,
the estimates are obtained for decisions that involve much higher stakes than the ones in
our experiment.23
The literal interpretation is that the choices come from individuals that are indifferent
between green and yellow and randomize between them in the observed proportions. The
alternative interpretation (the “purification” approach to mixed strategies, see Harsanyi,
1973) is that preferences are heterogenous, so that some players (27/77 to be precise) are
more risk averse than α = 0.20 and choose yellow, and some others (50/77) are less risk
averse than α = 0.20 and choose green.24 In any case, it seems that a reasonably small
degree of risk aversion by at least some subjects can explain the fact that player 2 uses
strategies yellow and green.
It is more difficult to make sense of the significant use of strategy red by player 2. In the
game depicted in Table 4, we can see it is a weakly dominated strategy. Now assume that
players get some utility out of telling the truth, so that the utility of red for player 2 is not
u(5) but rather u(5+k). Under this assumption and for the value of α = 0.20, a player with
a value of k = 1.93 would be indifferent between red, yellow, and green.
22 We realize that this is a strong assumption, but the parameter is only intended to capture the attitudes toward
risk for the small range of values that pertain to the experiment.
23 See Barsky et al. (1997) or Chou et al. (1992) and references therein.
24 The problem with the second interpretation is that, if the players’ beliefs are constant over time, each individual
would choose the same strategy all the time. But the last Table in Appendix D shows that individual subjects did
change strategy choices during the experiment. It could be that their beliefs changed with experience, and sometimes
their best response was one strategy and sometimes it was the other.
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Table 5
Number of times each strategy is played
State
Red Yellow Green
Player 1 90 10 0
Player 2 45 30 25
Player 3 66 30 4
If we use the same parameters (α = 0.20, k = 1.93) with agent 3, the ratio of the
expected utilities of strategies red and yellow (assuming the probabilities for the strategies
of 2 are the observed frequencies in our data) is 1.02, which is not a bad approximation
for indifference.25 While α may not differ between players, k could depend on the strategic
situation facing the agent. For player 3, there is some “external” enforcement of truth-telling,
since by not telling the truth she risks getting 5 instead of 10.26 The value of k that makes
player 3 indifferent between red and yellow is k = 0.79.
Now let us examine the game when there are fines. After the appropriate re-labeling, the
observed frequencies of play are shown in Table 5.
If we again fix the behavior of player 1 as a truthful announcement, the resulting game
for players 2 and 3 is likewise.
Player 3 choice
Red Yellow Green
Player 2 choice
Red u(5), u(10) u(5), u(8) u(5), u(8)
Yellow u(4), u(10) u(10), u(15) Eu(I), Eu(I)
Green u(4), u(10) Eu(I), Eu(I) u(15), u(5)
Again, we first consider player 2. If she also believed that the probabilities for player
3 are the observed frequencies in the data, and using α = 0.20 as in the baseline treat-
ment, the ratio of the utilities of yellow and green is 1.00058. If we used the value of
k = 0.79 that makes player 3 indifferent between red and yellow in the baseline treat-
ment, the ratio of expected utilities of strategies red and yellow for player 2 in the fine
treatment is 1.00853. As for player 3, the ratio of utilities between strategies red and yel-
low using α = 0.20 and k = 0.79 is 1.013. Thus, we find that there are values of k
and α that explain most of the deviation from the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in both
games.
25 Given that in our case u(0) has been normalized to 0, the ratio of utilities is invariant to the utility representation
for any two Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
26 It might be that this reduces the “cognitive dissonance” associated with lying (see Akerlof and Dickens,
1982).
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Appendix C. Instructions
C.1. Most instructions are identical for both treatments: differences are indicated
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, there are 10 periods
and three types of people. The result of those periods will determine the money that you
will receive in this experiment. We have given you a sheet of paper with spaces to do an
announcement in every period. Your identification number and your type are printed on
them and will not change during the experiment. In each period, you will be in a group
with two other people, so that every group has one person of each type. The other people in
your group will not be constant for all 10 periods; instead, participants will be re-matched,
by identification numbers, with others for each period. While you may be matched with
the same person(s) on more than one occasion, you will not know it and at no point will
you ever know the identification number or the identity of the other group members in any
period.
Your benefits in each period are determined by the combination of the “state of nature” (a
color drawn randomly), your “preferences” in that state of nature, and one of three possible
“outcomes” that will be decreed by a central processor in each period using the information
provided. The state of nature (red, yellow or green) is obtained randomly at the beginning
of the period and is revealed to all the participants. The three different types of people have
different preferences among the outcomes in each state of nature and consequently different
benefits in every case.
Each period you will make an announcement about the state of nature in that period.
You can announce any color you wish (it does not have to be the color that was drawn).
Your announcement changes neither your preferences nor the state of nature, but it is part
of the information used by the central processor to determine the outcome. The state of
nature is the color of a card drawn randomly from a box in which there are three yellow
cards, four green cards, and five red cards. The card drawn is shown publicly to every-
one in the room. An announcement includes a color, an outcome, and an integer from {1,
2, 3}. The central processor will use the integers and the announced outcome to deter-
mine the decreed outcome when each of the three group members announces a different
color.
Although these terms are intended to be quite general, here is a specific example follows.
Consider the state of nature to be the “weather”, the announcement to be a “weather
report” and the outcome to be an “activity”. Suppose the weather may be either “hot”
(red), “warm” (yellow), or “cold” (green), and that there are three possible activities: ex-
ercising (a), watching TV (b), and reading (c). Think of the three types as three different
siblings and the central processor as an absent tutor, who must decide on an activity for
her children for the day without knowing the weather, using only the children’s weather
reports.
If the weather is hot (red), following features will take place.
A ‘type 1’ prefers exercise (a), next prefers TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
A ‘type 2’ prefers TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
A ‘type 3’ prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers TV (b).
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If the weather is warm (yellow), following features will take place.
A ‘type 1’ prefers TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
A ‘type 2’ prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers TV (b).
A ‘type 3’ prefers exercise (a), next prefers TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
If the weather is cold (green), following features will take place.
A ‘type 1’ prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers TV (b).
A ‘type 2’ prefers exercise (a), next prefers TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
A ‘type 3’ prefers TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
The following table summarizes this information.
Red Yellow Green
1 a > b > c b > c > a c > a > b
2 b > c > a c > a > b a > b > c
3 c > a > b a > b > c b > c > a
C.2. Monetary benefits in pesetas for the chosen period
We assume that there is a monetary equivalent for the utility enjoyed by the activities.
The nine statements later describe the money received by the three types of players in each
state of nature.
In state red,
a type 1 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c;
a type 2 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c;
a type 3 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
In state yellow,
a type 1 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c;
a type 2 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c;
a type 3 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
In state green,
a type 1 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c;
a type 2 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c;
a type 3 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
In treatment 2, the payoffs described earlier are modified in some cases, as described in
points 2–4 of the ‘outcome rules’ for treatment 2.
C.3. Outcome rules
If the three group members announce:
red, then the outcome is a;
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yellow, then the outcome is c;
green, then the outcome is b.
We can summarize this information in the following way.
RRR = a, YYY = c, GGG = b
The first capital letter denotes the announcement of type 1 (R stands for red, Y for yellow
and G for green), the second capital letter is the announcement of type 2, the third capital
letter is the announcement of type 3, and the lowercase letter after the equal sign denotes
the outcome, given these announcements.
• If exactly two group members announce red, the outcome is a, unless the group member
announcing something different is a type 1. In that case if the type 1 announces yellow,
the outcome is b; if the type 1 announces green, the outcome is c.
RRY = a, RRG = a, RYR = a, RGR = a, YRR = b, GRR = c
(In treatment 2, the additional information is if the announcement is RRY or RRG,
then the type 3 group member will receive 200 pesetas less than the amount shown in
the payoff table for treatment 1. If the announcement is RYR or RGR, then the type 2
group member receives 100 pesetas less than the quantity shown in the payoff table for
treatment 1.)
• If exactly two group members announce yellow, the outcome is c, unless the group mem-
ber announcing something different is a type 2. In that case if the type 2 announces red,
the outcome is b; if the type 2 announces green, the outcome is c.
YYR = c, YYG = c, RYY = c, GYY = c, YRY = b, YRY = a
(In treatment 2, the additional information is if the announcement is RYY or GYY, then
the type 1 group member will receive 200 pesetas less than the amount shown in the
payoff table for treatment 1. If the announcement is YYR or YYG, then the type 3
group member receives 100 pesetas less than the quantity shown in the payoff table for
treatment 1.)
• If exactly two group members announce green, the outcome is b, unless the group mem-
ber announcing something different is a type 3. In that case if the type 3 announces red,
the outcome is c; if the type 3 announces yellow, the outcome is a.
GYG = b, GRG = b, YGG = b, RGG = b, GGY = a, GGR = c
(In treatment 2, the additional information if the announcement is GYG or GRG, then
the type 2 group member will receive 200 pesetas less than the amount shown in the
payoff table for treatment 1. If the announcement is YGG or RGG, then the type 1
group member receives 100 pesetas less than the quantity shown in the payoff table for
treatment 1.)
• If all three members of a group announce different colors, then the central proces-
sor adds the three integers selected by the three group members. The processor in
this case will decree the announced outcome (a, b, or c) by one of the group
members.
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That group member is chosen in the following way.
If the sum is 4 or 7, then the group member is the type 1 person.
If the sum is 5 or 8, then the group member is the type 2 person.
If the sum is 3, 6,or 9, then the group member is the type 3 person.
RYG(3)= 3, RYG(4) = 1, RYG(5) = 2, RYG(6) = 3, RYG(7) = 1,
RYG(8)= 2, RYG(9) = 3
The number in parenthesis to the left of the equal sign is the sum of the announced integers,
and the number to the right of the equal sign is the type of the agent whose announced
outcome will become the decreed outcome. The same thing that happens with YGR also
happens with YRG, GYR, GRY, RYG, and RGY.
(Notice that there are as many combinations that sum to 4 or 7—exactly 9—as there are
for 5 or 8, or even for 3, 6 or 9.)
C.4. Procedure
When the experiment begins, a color will be randomly drawn and you will write an
announcement in your sheet. The announcement consist of declaring at the same time a
state of the world (red, yellow or green), an integer in {1, 2, 3} and an outcome in {a, b, c}.
The announcement sheets will then be collected and the announcements will be processed
to determine the outcome, either a, b, or c.
The experimenter will then compute your benefits for the period and your announce-
ment sheet will be returned to you with these indicated. You will only be informed of
your payoffs. You will not be informed of the announcements or payoffs of other group
members.
Next we will proceed to the following period. At the end of 10 periods, the exper-
iment will end. Each person will receive a show-up fee and the benefits obtained in
the period selected to be the payment period. Each person will be paid individually and
privately.
The payment period will be chosen at random at the end of the experiment. We will have
cards numbered from 1 to 10. A student will select one of these cards at random and the
number of the card selected will determine the payment period.
C.5. Exercises
To ensure that people understand how the mechanism works, we will do some exercises.
1. Suppose that the monitor draws a red card and all group members announce red. What
is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What are the payoffs for the type 1 person?
The type 2 person? The type 3 person?
2. Suppose that the monitor draws a red card and types 2 and 3 announce red, while type 1
announces green. What is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What are the payoffs
for the type 1 person? The type 2 person? The type 3 person?
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3. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and types 1 and 3 announce green, while
type 2 announces red. What is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What are the
payoffs for the type 1 person? The type 2 person? The type 3 person?
4. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and all group members announce yellow?
What is the outcome? What are the payoffs for the type 1 person? The type 2 person?
The type 3 person?
5. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and types 1 and 3 announce yellow, while
type 2 announces green. What is the outcome? What are the payoffs for the type 1
person? The type 2 person? The type 3 person?
6. Suppose the monitor draws a yellow card, types 1–3 announce (respectively) red, yellow,
and green, the integers 1–3, and the outcomes a–c. What is the outcome? What are the
payoffs for the type 1 person? The type 2 person? The type 3 person?
7. Suppose the monitor draws a yellow card, types 1–3 announce (respectively) red, yel-
low, and green, the integers 1, 2, and 2, and the outcomes c, b, and c. What is the
outcome? What are the payoffs for the type 1 person? The type 2 person? The type
3 person?
Once the experiment begins, all communication between participants is strictly forbidden.
Please ask questions before we begin. Are there any questions?
The following table (payoff summary table for treatment 1) may be of help in summarizing
the information about payoffs.
Announcements True state
R Y G
RRR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RRY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RRG 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RYR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RGR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
YRR 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
GRR 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
YYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
YYR 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
YYG 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
GYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
RYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
YGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
YRY 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
GGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
YGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
RGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
GYG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
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Appendix C (Continued )
Announcements True state
R Y G
GRG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
GGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
GGR 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
The following table (payoff summary table for treatment 2) may be of help in summarizing
the information about payoffs.
Announcements True state
R Y G
RRR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RRY 1500, 500, 800 500, 1000, 1300 1000, 1500, 300
RRG 1500, 500, 800 500, 1000, 1300 1000, 1500, 300
RYR 1500, 400, 1000 500, 900, 1500 1000, 1400, 500
RGR 1500, 400, 1000 500, 900, 1500 1000, 1400, 500
YRR 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
GRR 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
YYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
YYR 500, 1000, 1400 1000, 1500, 400 1500, 500, 900
YYG 500, 1000, 1400 1000, 1500, 400 1500, 500, 900
GYY 300, 1000, 1500 800, 1500, 500 1300, 500, 1000
RYY 300, 1000, 1500 800, 1500, 500 1300, 500, 1000
YGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
YRY 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
GGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
YGG 900, 1500, 500 1400, 500, 1000 400, 1000, 1500
RGG 900, 1500, 500 1400, 500, 1000 400, 1000, 1500
GYG 1000, 1300, 500 1500, 300, 1000 500, 800, 1500
GRG 1000, 1300, 500 1500, 300, 1000 500, 800, 1500
GGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
GGR 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
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Payments when the three group members announce different states (for both treatments).
Sum of
integers
Selected type,
announced outcome
True state
R Y G
3 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
3 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
3 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
4 1, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
4 1, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
4 1, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
5 2, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
5 2, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
5 2, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
6 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
6 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
6 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
7 1, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
7 1, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
7 1, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
8 2, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
8 2, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
8 2, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
9 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
9 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500
9 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000
The decision sheet stated the subject number and type.
DECISION SHEET
Player type:
Identification number:
Period State of the world Integer Outcome Payoff
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
25
26
27
28
29
Baseline treatment—session 1.
Player Most-favored state Second-favored state Least-favored state Aggregate
1 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 4/4 (100%) 9/10
2 3/3 (100%) 1/3 (33%) 2/4 (50%) 6/10
3 3/3 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 1/4 (25%) 7/10
4 3/3 (100%) 3/4 (75%) 0/3 (0%) 6/10
5 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50% 0/3 (0%) 5/10
6 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 0/3 (0%) 5/10
7 4/4 (100%) 1/3 (33%) 1/3 (33%) 6/10
8 4/4 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 9/10
9 2/4 (50%) 1/3 (33%) 2/3 (67%) 5/10
10 3/4 (75%) 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 8/10
11 2/3 (67%) 3/4 (75%) 0/3 (0%) 5/10
12 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 0/4 (0%) 5/10
13 4/4 (100%) 1/3 (33%) 0/3 (0%) 5/10
14 3/3 (100%) 3/4 (75%) 0/3 (0%) 6/10
15 2/3 (67%) 1/3 (33%) 0/4 (0%) 3/10
Totals 45/50 (90%) 31/50 (62%) 14/50 (28%) 90/150 (60%)
Baseline treatment—session 2.
Player Most-favored state Second-favored state Least-favored state Aggregate
1 6/6 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 1/2 (50%) 8/10
2 6/6 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 1/2 (50%) 8/10
3 5/6 (83%) 2/2 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 8/10
4 1/2 (50%) 1/2 (50%) 1/6 (17%) 3/10
5 2/2 (100%) 0/2 (0%) 1/6 (17%) 3/10
6 2/2 (100%) 0/2 (0%) 1/6 (17%) 3/10
7 2/2 (100%) 2/6 (33%) 0/2 (0%) 4/10
8 2/2 (100%) 4/6 (67%) 0/2 (0%) 6/10
9 2/2 (100%) 6/6 (100%) 0/2 (0%) 8/10
10 2/2 (100%) 2/6 (33%) 0/2 (0%) 4/10
11 2/2 (100%) 0/2 (0%) 2/6 (33%) 4/10
12 6/6 (100%) 2/2 (100%) 0/2 (0%) 8/10
13 2/2 (100%) 0/6 (0%) 0/2 (0%) 2/10
14 2/2 (100%) 2/2 (100%) 1/6 (17%) 5/10
15 6/6 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 0/2 (0%) 7/10
Total 48/50 (96%) 24/50 (48%) 9/50 (18%) 81/150 (54%)
Aggregated 93/100 (93%) 55/100 (55%) 23/100 (23%) 171/300 (57%)
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Fine treatment—session 3.
Player Most-favored state Second-favored state Least-favored state Aggregate
1 3/3 (100%) 3/4 (75%) 1/3 (33%) 7/10
2 1/3 (33%) 1/4 (25%) 1/3 (33%) 3/10
3 3/3 (100%) 4/4 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 10/10
4 4/4 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 9/10
5 2/4 (50%) 2/3 (67%) 0/3 (0%) 4/10
6 4/4 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 1/3 (33%) 7/10
7 3/3 (100%) 0/3 (0%) 1/4 (25%) 4/10
8 3/3 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 1/4 (25%) 7/10
9 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 2/4 (50%) 7/10
10 3/3 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 0/4 (0%) 6/10
11 4/4 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 0/3 (0%) 6/10
12 3/3 (100%) 3/4 (75%) 1/3 (33%) 7/10
13 2/3 (67%) 1/3 (33%) 3/4 (75%) 6/10
14 4/4 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 9/10
15 3/3 (100%) 1/4 (25%) 1/3 (33%) 5/10
Totals 45/50 (90%) 33/50 (66%) 19/50 (38%) 97/150 (65%)
Fine treatment—session 4.
Player Most-favored state Second-favored state Least-favored state Aggregate
1 3/3 (100%) 4/4 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 9/10
2 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 2/3 (67%) 7/10
3 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 0/3 (0%) 5/10
4 2/4 (50%) 1/3 (33%) 1/3 (33%) 4/10
5 3/4 (75%) 1/3 (33%) 2/3 (67%) 6/10
6 4/4 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 1/3 (33%) 7/10
7 3/3 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 8/10
8 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 2/4 (50%) 7/10
9 3/3 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 8/10
10 2/3 (67%) 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 7/10
11 4/4 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 9/10
12 3/3 (100%) 1/4 (25%) 1/3 (33%) 5/10
13 3/3 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 3/4 (75%) 8/10
14 3/4 (75%) 2/3 (67%) 1/3 (33%) 6/10
15 3/3 (100%) 2/4 (50%) 2/3 (67%) 7/10
Total 45/50 (90%) 33/50 (66%) 25/50 (50%) 103/150 (69%)
Aggregated 90/100 (90%) 66/100 (66%) 44/100 (23%) 200/300 (67%)
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Frequency of individual truth-telling, by states
Truth-telling
rate (%)
Most-favored
state
Second-favored
state
Least-favored
state
Baseline 100 24 7 1
83 1 0 0
75 1 3 0
67 2 3 3
50 2 6 4
33 0 7 2
25 0 0 1
17 0 0 4
0 0 4 15
Fine 100 23 10 1
75 2 2 2
67 2 8 7
50 2 3 5
33 1 3 9
25 0 3 2
0 0 1 4
Actual outcomes, by sessions.
Session 1—three red, four green, three yellow.
Session 2—six red, two green, two yellow.
Session 3—three red, three green, four yellow.
Session 4—three red, three green, four yellow.
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